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Abstract
Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? Do
contestants avoid competition? In this paper we show that the distribution of abil-
ities plays a crucial role in determining contest choice. Positive sorting exist only
when the proportion of high ability contestants is suﬃciently small. As this pro-
portion increases, contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases.
Eventually, contests with smaller prizes attract stronger participants, i.e. there ex-
ists negative sorting. We test our theoretical predictions using a large panel data
set containing contest choice over three decades. We use exogenous variation in
the participation of highly able competitors to provide empirical evidence for the
relationship between prizes and sorting.
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11 Introduction
Competition is a deﬁning feature of most economic and social environments. Contestants
of diﬀering ability compete for valuable but limited resources by exerting eﬀort. In many
cases, contestants choose from a variety of potential contests. For example, architects
choose design competitions, pharmaceutical companies select from a range of R&D con-
tests, athletes pick sports tournaments, and college graduates apply for positions that
oﬀer alternative promotion schemes.
It has been shown both theoretically (Clark and Riis (1998), Moldovanu and Sela
(2001)), as well as empirically (Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990)), that eﬀort choices
are sensitive to the size and the allocation of a contest’s prize budget. Competition is
especially intense in contests that oﬀer large but few prizes. For example, working hours of
up to 80 h/week are common practice at McKinsey & Company, whose up–or–out policy
promises large wage increases but entails that “25% of the ﬁrm is new every year.”1 In the
US pharmaceutical industry, where the beneﬁts from patent protection are substantial but
restricted to the few drugs that obtain approval, annual R&D costs have been reported
to exceed 25 billion US$ (DiMasi et al. (2003)).
While the relationship between prizes and eﬀort seems to be well understood, little is
known about their inﬂuence on contest selection. Other incentive schemes, such as piece
rates, have been praised for their capacity to screen workers according to their ability
(Stiglitz (1975) and Lazear (1986)). Moreover, the productivity gains associated with
the self–selection of the most able workers have been shown to be as important as those
related to incentive eﬀects (Lazear (2000)). Several studies have therefore emphasized the
importance of contest design for the attraction of high quality participants. For example,
Burguet and Sakovics (1999) argue that auctions may use their reserve prices to screen
buyers according to their valuations. Similarly, Fullerton and McAfee (1999) propose entry
1Interview with former managing director, Rajat Gupta, Academy of Management Executive, 2001,
Vol. 15, No. 2.
2fees as a means to improve the quality of participants in a research tournament. Since
prizes are an inseparable feature of any competitive environment, an important question
is whether they serve a similar purpose. In this paper we consider, both theoretically as
well as empirically, whether prizes induce contestants to sort according to their abilities.
One might expect that the contest with the largest prize attracts the most able con-
testants. However, there are several reasons why this intuition may fail to hold. First,
contests with smaller prizes might be preferred since they induce lower eﬀort costs. This
phenomenon has been observed in the pharmaceutical industry where an increasing num-
ber of companies, including the biggest, have started to develop generic drugs for which
beneﬁts are smaller but approval is less costly to obtain.2 Second, contests with a higher
number of prizes might be preferred since they oﬀer a greater chance of success. This is
in line with a ﬂattening of corporate hierarchies documented by Rajan and Wulf (2006)
which can be interpreted as the companies’ attempt to win the “war for talent” by oﬀer-
ing workers a higher chance of retainment (Michaels et al. (2001)). Finally, unlike in a
standard screening framework (Mirrlees (1971), Spence (1973)), contest choice constitutes
a strategic decision since contestants have an interest to avoid strong opponents.
In this paper, we show that the contests with the largest prize(s) do not necessarily
attract the most able contestants. Instead, the distribution of talent across contests
depends in a systematic way on the overall distribution of abilities amongst contestants.
In our model, two types of contestants (high and low ability) choose between two types
of contests (strong and weak competition). High ability contestants have lower marginal
costs of eﬀort than low ability contestants. Strong contests oﬀer greater but fewer prizes
than weak contests and therefore induce higher eﬀorts, i.e., stronger competition. Our
main theoretical result shows that the share of high ability contestants who choose strong
competition is decreasing in the overall fraction of high ability contestants. When high
2For example, through its generic unit Greenstone, Pﬁzer develops generic versions of existing drugs,
including its own. See “More Generics Slow Rise in Drug Prices” New York Times, August 8, 2007.
3ability contestants become suﬃciently frequent, weak competition attracts an even larger
share of high ability contestants than strong competition. Hence the common perception
that larger prizes attract stronger competitors fails to hold in general.
We take advantage of an unusually clean opportunity to empirically investigate the
extent of sorting across contests. With around 20,000 observations, we examine contest
choice of professional marathon runners over three decades. The set-up allows us to
abstract from a number of identiﬁcation problems present in other types of data. For
example, while in a labor-market setting it is often impossible to disentangle between ﬁrm
and worker types and to abstract from complementarities in team–work, in marathons
individual performance is readily available. In addition, there are three features that
make marathons the ideal setting to test our model. First, marathon running is strongly
dominated by a small group of highly talented East-African runners, mainly from Kenya
and Ethiopia. This endows us with a proxy of the contestants’ abilities (runners’ origin),
which, unlike performance measures (ﬁnishing times), is independent of eﬀort and prize
considerations. Second, ﬁve Major marathons (Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London, and New
York), oﬀer more than 50% of the total available prize money but also the lowest chances
of success. This allows us to identify a runner’s decision between competing in a Major
or a Minor marathon, as a choice between strong and weak competition. Finally, due to
the abolishment of the amateur rule by the International Olympic Committee, marathons
started to oﬀer prize money in the mid–1980s. This led to a substantial increase in the
participation of Kenyan and Ethiopian runners and hence, altered the overall distribution
of abilities.
In accordance with our theory, we ﬁnd that the likelihood of an elite runner to partici-
pate in one of the Major marathons is increasing in the race’s prize budget and decreasing
in the expected number of high ability opponents, measured by the number of Kenyan
and Ethiopian participants in last year’s race. Following Br¨ uckner and Ciccone (2010), we
use exogenous variation in local economic conditions to predict participation of Kenyan
4and Ethiopian runners. Our analysis allow us to determine the “price” that contestants
assign to opposition. Our estimates show that elite runners are willing to forgo potential
prize winnings of 25,500$ for each high ability opponent they are able to avoid.
In line with our main theoretical result, we ﬁnd that, as the number of high ability
participants increases, they become more likely to avoid competition. In particular, as
the share of Kenyan and Ethiopian runners increases by 10 percent, the fraction of high
ability runners who choose to participate in Major races falls by 10.3 percent. According
to our estimates, Major races would have to increase their prize budgets by 8.8 percent
to maintain their attractiveness to high ability runners.
These results constitute the ﬁrst evidence for tournament selection eﬀects. Previous
studies have focused on the choice between tournaments and alternative incentive schemes
using experimental setups. For example, Dohmen and Falk (2011) report the results of
a real–eﬀort experiment in which subjects choose between a pairwise tournament and
a ﬁxed payment. They ﬁnd that apart from having higher ability, subjects who choose
a tournament have lower degrees of risk aversion and a more optimistic self assessment.
Eriksson et al. (2009) reports similar results for the choice between a pairwise tournament
and piece–rates. Our results complement these ﬁndings by considering the frequently
encountered choice between tournaments of diﬀering prize structure.
2 The model
We consider a continuum of contests with mass one. Each contest allows for N ≥ 3
participants. There are two types of contests j ∈ {S,W}. For reasons explained below
they are denominated as strong contests (S) and weak contests (W). A contest of type j
oﬀers Mj ∈ {1,2,...,N−1} identical prizes of size bj > 0 and a performance–independent
(i.e. ﬁxed wage) payment wj ≥ 0 to each of its participants.3 In a labor tournament
3The assumption that a contest’s prizes are all identical makes the model tractable. A general de-
scription of competition for the case of N ≥ 3 heterogeneous players and M > 1 non–identical prizes is
5setting, wj could represent the workers base wage, while bj measures the wage increase or
bonus for those who become promoted.
Contests of type S award higher (bS > bW) but fewer (MS < MW) prizes than contests
of type W.4 Apart from diﬀerences in their payment structures, contests are assumed to
be identical. For simplicity we assume that both types of contests exist in equal fractions.
Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when this assumption is relaxed.
There is a continuum of risk–neutral players with mass N.5 Players diﬀer with respect
to their constant marginal cost of eﬀort c. There are two types of players, i ∈ {L,H}.
A high ability player’s marginal cost of eﬀort is cH > 0, while low ability players have
marginal cost cL > cH. A fraction h ∈ (0,1) of players has high ability and the distribution
of abilities is common knowledge amongst players.
In each contest, players compete for prizes by exerting eﬀort. We follow an extensive
literature on contest design (see for example Clark and Riis (1998) or Moldovanu and Sela
(2001, 2006)) by assuming that contests are perfectly discriminating. This means that in
each contest, prizes are awarded to the players with the highest levels of eﬀort while ties
are broken randomly.6 A player of type i ∈ {L,H} who exerts eﬀort e ≥ 0 in a contest of
type j ∈ {S,W} will receive the payoﬀ U
j
i = wj +bj −cie if he wins one of the Mj prizes
and U
j
i = wj − cie otherwise.
The model has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, players simultaneously choose which type
of contest to enter. Once they have entered a contest, players observe the abilities of their
opponents. In the second stage, players compete by simultaneously selecting their eﬀort
levels.
When the number of players who choose a particular type of contest exceeds the
still missing. A ﬁrst step into this direction has been made by Cohen and Sela (2008).
4In a labor tournament setting Yun (1997) shows that ﬁrst best eﬀorts and eﬃcient self–selection can
be achieved when workers are oﬀered the choice between a tournament with many high prizes and a
tournament with few small prizes.
5The implications of risk aversion are discussed in Section 4.
6Alternatively, winners could be determined stochastically, i.e. in dependence of eﬀorts and random
factors. For a discussion of this case see Section 3.
6number of available slots players need to be rationed. As a rationing rule we assume
that each contest accepts as many high ability players as possible and ﬁlls any remaining
slots with low ability players.7 We show below that, in equilibrium, high ability players
are never rationed, i.e. their allocation is driven entirely by preferences and not by the
rationing rule. Those players who were turned down by the contest of their choice enter
a contest of the other type. This is optimal since players have zero outside options and
expected payoﬀs are strictly positive in both types of contest.
3 Individual contest choice
In this section we determine the players’ expected payoﬀ from participating in a contest
in dependence of the contest’s payment/prize structure and its set of participants. Since
the total number of players matches the total number of contest slots, in equilibrium each
contest will have N participants. Hence in a contest of type j, N players will compete
for Mj identical prizes. Players value a prize identically at bj but diﬀer in their marginal
costs of eﬀort ci. Since players are risk–neutral and eﬀort costs are linear, the model is
equivalent to a multi–unit all–pay auction where bidders have identical costs but diﬀer in
the value vi = bj/ci they attach to obtaining a unit.8
Clark and Riis (1998) show that the equilibrium of an all–pay auction with heteroge-
neous players and M identical prizes is necessarily in mixed strategies. This equilibrium
is unique when all players have diﬀerent valuations. When some players’ valuations are
identical, multiple equilibria might exist but equilibria are payoﬀ–equivalent (see Baye,
Kovenock, and de Vries (1996)). When players are ordered according to their valuations,
i.e. vn ≥ vm for all n < m, then expected payoﬀs are vn − vM+1 for the players with the
7Note that the above assumption requires organizers to observe the players’ abilities. While in a sports
context the athletes’ abilities can be deducted from past performances, in the labor market entry tests
or interviews are typically employed to select the most able amongst the applicants.
8In an M–unit all–pay auction a bidder who bids xi and values the object at vi obtains the utility
vi −xi if his bid is amongst the M highest bids. Otherwise his utility is −xi. To match the auction with
our contest identify bids with eﬀorts and multiply utilities by ci.
7M highest valuations and zero for all other players.
This result has the following implications for our model. In a contest of type j, players
may attach two diﬀerent values to obtaining one of the Mj prizes. A low ability player
assigns the value vL = bj/cL whereas a high ability player has valuation vH = bj/cH >
vL. A high ability player therefore expects a payoﬀ (net of performance independent
payments) equal to cH(vH − vL) = bj(1 −
cH
cL) if the number of high ability players is
smaller or equal to the number of prizes and zero otherwise. For low ability players,
expected payoﬀs can never exceed the contest’s performance independent payment. The
following lemma summarizes these ﬁndings.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Hj high ability players and N −Hj low ability players participate
in a contest of type j ∈ {S,W} . A high ability players’s expected payoﬀ is E[U
j
H|Hj] =
wj + bj(1 −
cH
cL) if Hj ≤ Mj and E[U
j
H|Hj] = wj if Hj > Mj. A low ability player’s
expected payoﬀ is E[U
j
L|Hj] = wj irrespective of Hj.
The fact that the expected payoﬀs of low ability players are independent of prizes is due
to our assumption that contests are perfectly discriminating. Low ability players choose
positive eﬀort levels and win a prize with positive probability but their expected prize
winnings are exactly compensated by their eﬀort costs. If contests involved a random
element then expected payoﬀs of low ability players would depend on prizes but this
dependence would still be weaker than for high ability players. This diﬀerence can be
understood as a Spence–Mirrlees single–crossing condition which reﬂects the fact that
high ability players have a stronger preference for prizes (as opposed to eﬀort cost savings)
than low ability players. It gives rise to the possibility of sorting. Note however, that this
interpretation requires a player’s set of opponents to be ﬁxed, i.e. the players’ strategic
interaction is neglected. Also note that the players’ incentive to sort is strongest when
contests are perfectly discriminating. Hence our insight that the most competitive prize
structures may fail to attract the most able contestants will extend to the case where
8contest outcomes are random. For a detailed investigation of the relationship between a
contest’s prize structure and its randomness see Azmat and M¨ oller (2009).
We are now ready to describe a player’s individual preferences at the time of contest
choice. From Lemma 1 it immediately follows that for a low ability player the expected
payoﬀ from entering a contest of type i is independent of the set of opponents and given
by E[U
j
L] = wj. Hence low ability players simply prefer the contest with the highest
performance independent payment, wj, and are indiﬀerent when wS = wW.
Next consider high ability players. Let pj denote the likelihood with which an opponent
in a contest of type j has high ability. The probability with which a high ability player
obtains a payoﬀ in excess of wj in contest j equals the probability with which the player









A high ability player’s expected utility from entering a contest of type j is given by
E[U
j




It depends on the contest’s overall prize budget via wj, the allocation of prizes via Mj
and bj, and the (expected) strength of his opponents represented by pj. In the Appendix
we prove the following intuitive result:
Proposition 1 A high ability player’s expected payoﬀ from entering a contest of type j,
is increasing in the performance independent payment wj, and the number Mj and size
bj of prizes, but decreasing in the probability pj with which opponents have high ability.
Payoﬀs are increasing in the steepness of contest j’s prize structure when pj < ¯ pj but
decreasing when pj > ¯ pj.
While the ﬁrst claim of Proposition 1 is straight forward, the second claim requires
some explanation. Suppose that we increase the steepness of contest j’s prize structure by
9raising bj and lowering Mj. Contest j then awards higher but fewer prizes. Hence winners
earn higher rewards but competition becomes ﬁercer leading to higher eﬀort costs. When
the probability to meet high ability opponents is small, high ability players prefer higher
(though fewer) prizes due to their comparative advantage over low ability players. In
contrast, when the probability to meet high ability opponents is large, high ability players
prefer more (though smaller) prizes due to their mitigating eﬀect on competition and the
resulting decrease in eﬀort costs.
4 Distribution of talent
What do the players’ individual preferences imply for the equilibrium allocation of talent?
Since players make their choice contingent on the expected abilities of their opponents,
a player’s contest choice depends directly on the choices of all other players. This dis-
tinguishes the present model from standard models of sorting where the choices of other
players matter only indirectly, i.e. via their inﬂuence on the beliefs about the players’
types. In the last section we saw that in our setup, the contest choice of low ability players
depends exclusively on the contests’ performance independent payments. In particular,
the choice of low ability players is independent of the behavior of high ability players.
This allows us to concentrate on the contest choice of high ability players, making the
model tractable.
Suppose that a fraction q ∈ [0,1] of the high ability players choose strong contests
while the remaining fraction 1 − q choose weak contests. If both fractions, q and 1 − q,
are suﬃciently small, i.e. if max{q,(1−q)}hN < N
2 , then all high ability players are able
to enter the contest of their choice. The probability with which a slot of type S is ﬁlled
with a high ability player is then given by pS = 2hq while a slot of type W is ﬁlled with
probability pW = 2h(1 − q). If instead max{q,(1 − q)}hN ≥ N
2 then high ability players
would exhibit excess demand for one type of contest. In this case pS = 1 and pW = 2h−1
10or vice versa. The contest choice of high ability players is determined by the diﬀerence
between their expected payoﬀ from entering a strong contest and their expected payoﬀ
from entering a weak contest. From (2) this diﬀerence is proportional to






High ability players strictly prefer a contest of type S (W) when ∆ > 0 (∆ < 0) and are
indiﬀerent when ∆ = 0. We are now able to state our main result:
Proposition 2 If contests oﬀer identical performance independent payments (wS = wW)
then in the unique equilibrium a fraction q∗ of high ability players enter strong contests
and the following holds: q∗ = 1 for all h ∈ (0,¯ h] where ¯ h <
1
2; q∗ ∈ (
1
2,1) and strictly
decreasing in h for all h ∈ (¯ h,¯ ¯ h); q∗ ≤
1
2 for all h ∈ [¯ ¯ h,1). An increase in wS, MS, or bS
and a decrease in wW, MW, or bW all lead to an upward shift in q∗.
One may expect that contests which oﬀer higher but fewer prizes should be more
attractive to high ability players. Proposition 2 shows that this intuition fails to hold in
general. The equilibrium allocation of talent depends on the overall distribution of talent
within the population of players as can be seen in Figure 1.
When the fraction h of high ability players is small, i.e. h ≤ ¯ h, then all high ability
players choose strong competition, i.e. there is complete (positive) sorting of abilities.
For intermediate values of h, i.e. ¯ h < h < ¯ ¯ h, high ability players are still more likely to
choose strong competition than weak competition but sorting is only partial and strictly
decreasing in h. When h is large, i.e. h ≥ ¯ ¯ h, strong competition attracts less high ability
players than weak competition, i.e. sorting is reversed (negative). Note that ¯ h <
1
2 implies
that complete sorting can never occur when high ability players are equally frequent as
low ability players. Also note that in the equilibrium described by Proposition 2, high
ability players are never rationed. If in one type of contest, all slots would be ﬁlled with
high ability players, then all high ability players would strictly prefer the other type of
11contest. Only in the limit, as h → 1, both types of contests become ﬁlled by high ability
participants and q∗ → 1
2.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. Strong contests oﬀer high potential prizes
while weak contests mitigate competition and are characterized by low eﬀort costs. From
the viewpoint of a high ability player, eﬀort considerations become more important as the
likelihood to meet high ability rivals increases and the comparative advantage over low
ability players becomes less likely to play a role. When high abilities become suﬃciently
frequent, the mitigation of competition becomes so valuable that high ability players
prefer weak contests over strong contests even though rivals in the former are expected
to be more able than rivals in the latter.
An increase in wS, MS, or bS, or a decrease in wW, MW, or bW, raises the payoﬀ that
players expect in contests of type S relative to type W. This leads to an upward shift
in q∗. As can be seen from Figure 1, the range where sorting is complete becomes larger
and q∗ increases wherever q∗ < 1.
Finally, let us discuss the possible inﬂuence of risk aversion on the players’ contest
choice. From the viewpoint of a high ability player, each type of contest can be understood
as a lottery with two possible outcomes. A high payoﬀ is obtained when the number of
high ability participants fails to exceed the number of prizes, and a low payoﬀ is obtained
otherwise. For q >
1
2, the high payoﬀ, though smaller, is more likely to be obtained
in weak contests than in strong contests. Hence weak contests constitute the less risky
lottery. Risk aversion gives high ability players an additional incentive to choose a weak
rather than a strong contest. As a consequence, q∗ can be expected to be lower, i.e. risk
aversion leads to a decrease in sorting. Note that this discussion ignores the fact that
risk aversion will also inﬂuence the way in which players compete. It has been shown
for example, that (in a contest with a single prize) risk aversion decreases the eﬀort of
low ability contestants but increases the eﬀort of high ability contestants (Fibich et al.
(2006)). Since weak contests reduce eﬀort costs by mitigating competition, we therefore
12contemplate that, as before, risk aversion makes weak contests become more attractive for
high ability players (and less attractive for low ability players). A thorough investigation
of the eﬀect of risk aversion would require an extension of the work of Clark and Riis
(1998) to the case of risk averse players and is beyond the present analysis.
5 Empirical Framework
In this section we will test the predictions of the model using a large panel dataset of
international city marathons. Testing the model requires a setting in which individual
abilities are observable and the distribution of abilities is subject to changes. In addition,
prize structures should be known and should diﬀer across contests. Marathon data oﬀers
several advantages over, for example, data on labor tournaments. While prizes and perfor-
mance are easily observed in marathons, a ﬁrm’s pay–structure and a worker’s individual
performance are hardly available. While marathons are fairly homogeneous in their setup,
ﬁrms diﬀer in dimensions other than their pay–structure.9 Finally, while professional run-
ners choose two marathons per year, employment relations are established less frequently,
making equilibrium behavior less likely to emerge. Beyond these advantages, there are
three important reasons for why marathons in particular constitute the ideal setting to
test our theory.
First, a surprisingly high fraction of the best marathon runners are of East–African
origin. In 2009, 62 of the 100 fastest (male) marathon runners were Kenyan and 26 were
Ethiopian.10 In the same year, more than 70 percent of the available prize money was
won by Kenyan or Ethiopian runners. This dominance, unparalleled in other sports, has
been explained by genetic, social, nutritional, and geographical factors (Noakes, 1985). It
allows us to identify the most able contestants by origin, which, unlike past performance,
9Some marathons have faster (ﬂatter) race courses than others. To make marathons comparable,
we adjust all ﬁnishing times using a conversion factor constructed by the Association of Road Running
Statisticians. This is done throughout the entire analysis.
10See Top List of the International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF) available online at
http://www.iaaf.org/statisitics/toplist/index.html.
13is independent of prize and eﬀort considerations.
Second, East–African runners were hardly present in international marathons until
the mid 1980s. Running had become hugely popular in East–Africa in 1960, when the
Ethiopian marathon runner Abebe Bikila became the ﬁrst African to win an Olympic
gold medal. However, due to the amateur rule of the International Olympic Committee,
runners were not allowed to compete for money and city marathons refrained from of-
fering money prizes until the abolishment of the rule in 1986. As a result, East–African
runners participated almost exclusively in Olympic games and World–Championships. In
the 1980s, as a response to the abolition to the amateur rule, city marathons started to
award money prizes and prize budgets have increased ever since (see Figure 2). Today,
with winning prizes well above 100,000$, running means big money to athletes from East–
Africa. For example, in 2009 the per capita income in Kenya was approximately 1,000$
per annum. Not surprisingly, the number of East-African runners that compete interna-
tionally has increased steadily since the mid 1980s. In light of our theoretical model, this
change can be interpreted as an increase in the fraction of high ability contestants. It
has made the sport more competitive by decreasing the gap between winners and losers.
This can be seen in Figure 3 which depicts the ratio of the fastest race time of the year
over the average time of runners ﬁnishing a race in the top 20. While in the early 1980s,
the fastest runners had a comparative advantage of around 5 percent, this advantage has
decreased to less than 3 percent in the late 2000s.
The third important feature of marathon running is the fact that ﬁve races have
obtained a special status comparable to the Grand Slam tournaments in tennis. The
marathons in Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London, and New York have the longest tradi-
tion, the highest prize budgets, and the largest number of participants. Collectively, the
group annually attracts more than 5 million on-course spectators, 250 million television
viewers, and 150,000 participants. Its economic impact has been claimed to lie above
14400$ million.11 As can be seen from Figure 2, the ﬁve marathons award more than 50
percent of the total prize money available in the 35 races in our dataset. In 2006 they
launched the World Marathon Majors, a new point ranking oﬀering a $1 million prize to
the best performing runner of the series. In the following they will therefore be referred
to as “Major” marathons while all other races will be denoted as “Minor” marathons.
Major marathons are not only characterized by high prizes but also by a high number of
runners competing for each prize. A marathon runner therefore faces the trade-oﬀ that
is at the heart of our theoretical model: Participate in a Major marathon where prizes
are high but competition is strong or choose a Minor marathon where prizes are low but
competition is weak.
As a brief preview of our results, Figure 4 depicts the distribution of East–African
runners across the two race categories. In order to compare with the predictions of the
theoretical model depicted in Figure 1, we focus on the ten most important marathons (ﬁve
Major, ﬁve Minor). As the overall proportion of East–African participants increases, the
share which chooses a Major rather than a Minor marathon decreases. Beyond a certain
fraction of high ability runners, sorting is reversed, i.e. we observe negative sorting.
5.1 Data Description
We use data from the Association of Road Running Statisticians containing detailed
race and runner information for the largest international marathons from 1986 to 2009.12
We restrict attention to the 35 most relevant marathons.13 These are the races that have
existed for the longest time, such that they are present in our sample for the whole period.
They feature the highest participation, highest prize budgets and the fastest winning
11For more details see http://worldmarathonmajors.com/US/about/.
12We are grateful to Ken Young from the Association of Road Racing Statisticians for kindly providing
us with the data.
13These are: Beijing, Berlin, Boston, California International, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Dublin, Frank-
furt, Gold Coast, Grandma’s, Hamburg, Honolulu, Houston, Italia, Kosice, London, Los Angeles, Madrid,
New York, Ottawa, Paris, Reims, Richmond, San Antonio, Rome, Seoul, Stockholm, Tokyo, Turin, Twin
Cities, Valencia, Venice, Vienna, Warsaw.
15times. For each race, we observe the date, location, as well as the prize distribution.
At the runner level, we identify the top (professional) ﬁnishers for each race. Since we
are interested in the race choice of the most able runners we restrict attention to the
ﬁrst twenty ﬁnishers of each race. Since marathons award less than twenty prizes, for
each race our data therefore contains runners who win and runners who do not win a
prize. We have information on the runners’ gender, nationality, date of birth, ﬁnishing
time, ﬁnishing position, and the prize awarded (if any). Tables 1 and 2, provide the main
descriptive statistics for races and runners, respectively.
In Table 1, we separately show the descriptive statistics for Major and Minor races.
From this table, we can see that there are stark diﬀerences between these race categories.
Major races award around eight times as much prize money as Minor races (221,689$
compared with 26,371$). However, they also have around three times as many competitors
(22,332 compared with 6,838).14 In our theoretical model contests diﬀer in the number
of prizes, Mj, but have the same number of competitors, N. What matters for the
contest choice of a high ability contestant is the likelihood to be amongst the Mj most
able competitors. Since most marathons award less than 10 prizes, but the number of
competitors is much larger in Major marathons, the likelihood to be amongst the 10 most
able runners is lower in a Major marathon. Major marathons oﬀer higher prizes but the
chances of winning are lower. We can therefore identify Major races as strong contests and
Minor races as weak contests. Further motivation for this identiﬁcation can be obtained
by considering the allocation of prize budgets. In contrast to our theoretical model, the
prizes awarded by a marathon are not identical but decreasing in rank. This decrease
turns out to be steeper in Major races. 57% of the Major races have a prize allocation
that is steeper than the average compared to only 35% for Minor races.15
The two types of races also diﬀer in the quality of the runners they attract. From
14These numbers include amateur runners but the comparison of the size of the elite ﬁelds is similar.
15Steepness is measured by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index, calculated for the top three prizes.
16Table 1 we can see that, on average, over the years the fraction of high ability runners has
been considerably larger in the Major races. This holds no matter whether we identify
high ability runners by origin or by (course–adjusted) ﬁnishing times. For example, 18
percent of the ﬁnishers in the Major races were East–African compared to only 14 percent
in the other races. Similarly, 29 percent of runners in the Major races had a ﬁnishing
time within 5 percent of the year’s best, compared with only 8 percent in the Minor races.
As a consequence, winning times in Major races are on average 8 minutes faster which is
equivalent to a 2.6km lead. Part of this diﬀerence can be explained by the fact that, in
accordance with the model, the prizes oﬀered by a Major race induce higher eﬀort levels.
The remaining part is due to selection eﬀects, which will be the focus of our analysis.
Table 1 also compares the descriptive statistics for East–African and Non–East–
African runners. For male runners, the comparison shows that runners from East–Africa
are faster (2:14 compared to 2:17) and win higher prizes (8,307$ compared to 3,360$) than
runners from other origins. 28 percent of East African runners have (adjusted) ﬁnishing
times within 5% of the years’s fastest time, compared to only 21 percent for Non–East–
African runners. For female runners the diﬀerences are even larger. These numbers lend
support to our identiﬁcation of East–African runners as high ability contestants.
5.2 Individual contest choice
5.2.1 OLS Analysis
To test Proposition 1, we investigate how a runner’s expected payoﬀ from a marathon,
and hence his probability of entering, depends on the race’s characteristics. Letting Pijt
denote the probability with which runner i enters race j in time period t, we estimate the
following equation:
Pijt = α0 + αAAjt−1 + αBBjt + αSSjt + Xiβ + εijt. (4)
17Since we are interested in the runners’ choice between entering a Major and a Minor
race, we let Pijt take the value 1 whenever j is a Major race and the value 0 otherwise.
The variable Ajt−1 denotes the proportion of East–African runners amongst the race’s
top twenty ﬁnishers in the previous year. Due to the dominance of East–African runners,
Ajt−1 serves as a measure of the level of opposition to be expected. The variable Bjt
denotes the marathon’s total prize budget. Sjt is a dummy variable whose value is 1
when the race’s prize structure is steeper than the average. We also include a vector
of control variables, Xi, containing the runner’s age, nationality, gender, and ranking in
the previous year, and dummy variables indicating whether the race took place on the
runner’s home turf and whether the year was an Olympic year. We also control for time
trends and race ﬁxed eﬀects.16
According to Proposition 1, Pijt should be increasing in Bjt and decreasing in Ajt−1.
The predictions of Proposition 1 with respect to the steepness of the contest’s prize
structure are more complicated. Sjt should have a positive eﬀect on Pijt when Ajt−1 is
relatively small but a negative eﬀect when Ajt−1 is relatively large. For this reason, we
will also look at the interaction of Sjt with Ajt−1.
Since Proposition 1 is concerned with the preferences of high ability contestants, we
restrict attention to the race choice of the top ranked runners. However, since many of
these runners are East–African they could have also been contained in Ajt−1. In order to
avoid the resulting endogeneity problem, we restrict the analysis to the Top100 male and
Top100 female runners in a given year with origins diﬀerent from Kenya or Ethiopia.17
In particular, we estimate whether an increase in the fraction of East–African runners in
race j in the previous year, reduces the likelihood with which a Top100 Non–East–African
runner enters race j in the current year.
In Table 3, we present the results. Column 1 and 2 contain the results with and
16The results remain unchanged if year dummies are included in place of a linear time trend.
17Our results are robust with respect to changes in the cut–oﬀ point for our deﬁnition of “high-ability”.
18without controls, respectively. Column 3 includes trends and race ﬁxed–eﬀects. Overall,
we ﬁnd that an increase in expected opposition, leads to a signiﬁcant decrease in the entry
of high ability contestants. This persists in all speciﬁcations. Total prize money has a
strong and positive eﬀect on entry. We postpone the discussion of the size of these eﬀects
until the instrumental variable analysis below.
5.2.2 IV Analysis
An important concern is that Ajt−1 might be correlated with some unobservable charac-
teristics, leading to a biased estimate of αA. If a race becomes attractive to all high ability
runners for reasons unexplained by our set of observables, it will create a positive corre-
lation between the entry of these runners and the error term. For example, a race may
announce a special award for the achievement of a new course record, thereby raising its
attractiveness for both sets of runners. This translates into an upward biased estimate of
αA. To deal with this issue, we instrument for the participation of East–African runners,
Ajt−1. In other words, we use exogenous variation in the participation of East–African
runners that is uncorrelated with the (unobservable) race characteristics. We do this by
instrumenting Ajt−1 with rainfall, as well as commodity prices, in Kenya and Ethiopia.18
Both variables are correlated with the number of East–African runners who compete in a
given year but uncorrelated with race characteristics. Moreover, the race choice of Non–
East–African runners will be unaﬀected by these instruments, except through the eﬀect
they have on Ajt−1.
The reasoning behind the two instruments follows a growing literature, mainly in po-
litical economy, which relates rainfall and commodity prices to economic conditions in
Sub-Saharan countries. It has been shown that rainfall levels positively aﬀect income per
capita (Miguel et al. 2004) and the functioning of democratic institutions (Br¨ uckner and
Ciccone, 2010) in Sub-Saharan African countries. In addition, it has been documented
18This is preferable to using the countries’ GDP as an instrument since GDP is subject to world trends.
19by Deaton (1999) that commodity price downturns cause rapidly worsening economic
conditions in Sub-Saharan African economies. We therefore expect rainfall and com-
modity prices to have a positive eﬀect on the international marathon participation of
East–African runners. This is intuitive, since most East–African runners, in particular
the younger ones, rely on the support of sponsors, part of which are local businesses or
regional government agencies.
We construct international commodity price indices for Kenya and Ethiopia following
Deaton (1999) and Br¨ uckner and Ciccone (2010). For this purpose, we use the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund monthly price data for exported commodities for the period 1986
to 2009 and the countries’ export shares of these commodities taken from Deaton for
1990. The rainfall data cover the period 1986 to 2009 and is taken from the NASA Global
Precipitation Climatology Project.
We may also be concerned that race organizers adjust the total prize budget, Bjt, to
keep their race attractive for high ability contestants. If entry falls, race organizers may
increase prize money. As a consequence the coeﬃcient on Bjt will be biased downwards.
We deal with this problem by instrumenting the value of a race’s prize budget with the
exchange rate of the country where the race takes place relative to a currency basket. We
expect that a move in the exchange rate is associated with an exogenous change in the
value of the race’s prize budget. This change should not be associated directly with race
entry. In order to construct a currency basket, we use the annual Special Drawing Rights
basket provided by the International Monetary Fund.19
In Column 1 of Table 4, the ﬁrst stage estimates show that rainfall and commodity
prices are indeed strongly related to the participation of East–African runners in inter-
national marathons. In particular, with the exception of commodity prices in Ethiopia,
positive rainfall shocks and commodity price upturns, increase the number of East–African
19This basket contains U.S. Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, and Pound Sterling. Weights assigned to each
currency are adjusted annually to take account of changes in the share of each currency in world exports
and international reserves.
20runners competing internationally. In Column 2, we see that, as predicted, exchange rates
are strongly related to total prize money. Both (sets) of instruments are strong, with high
F-statistics.
In Table 5, we present the results for the IV estimates. As in the OLS regression,
we ﬁnd that entry is negatively aﬀected by expected opposition. However, the eﬀect is
stronger than in the OLS regressions, suggesting that αA is, indeed, upward biased when
using OLS. Using both instruments our estimation predicts that a Top100 runner who
expects 10 percent more opposition is 5.1 percent less likely to choose a Major race. We
also ﬁnd that an increase in total prize money is associated with a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the entry of Top100 runners. Using both instruments, our estimation predicts
that an additional 100,000$ in total prize money raises the likelihood that a Top100
runner participates in a Major race by 10.4 percent. Given that opposition refers to the
proportion of East–African runners amongst the ﬁrst twenty ﬁnishers in the previous year,
a 10 percent increase in opposition is equivalent to the participation of two additional
East–African runners. This implies that Top100 runners are willing to forgo potential
prize winnings of 25,500$ for each high ability opponent they are able to avoid. Finally,
with regard to the eﬀect of prize steepness on entry, we see that the coeﬃcient on the
interaction between steepness and expected opposition is negative, as predicted by the
model. However, this result is not statistically signiﬁcant.
When controlling for runners’ characteristics, we ﬁnd that runners who were more
highly ranked in the previous year, are more likely to enter a Major race in the current
year. In particular, within the Top100 runners, the highest ranked runner is 9 percent
more likely to enter a Major race then the lowest ranked runner. Hence there exists
evidence for a tendency of contestants to sort according to abilities. How this tendency
is inﬂuenced by the overall distribution of abilities is the subject of our next estimation.
215.3 Distribution of talent
While Proposition 1 was concerned with the individual preferences of contestants, Propo-
sition 2’s focus is on the equilibrium distribution of contestants across contests. We now
move from the determinants of individual race choice to the analysis of the aggregate
distribution of runners across races using the time–series variation.
In equilibrium, each player chooses a best response to the contest choice of all other
players by entering the contest that maximizes his expected payoﬀ. In our data a run-
ner’s outside option, i.e., the prize he could have won in another race assuming identical
performance, can be readily determined. A surprisingly high fraction of runners turns
out to choose a best response. We ﬁnd that around 40 percent of the prize winners could
not have earned a higher prize in any other marathon. A further 20 percent had only
one alternative race where their prize would have been higher. This suggests that in our
framework, contestants choose contests carefully and in order to maximize their expected
prize winnings. Contest choice is repeated over time and learning seems to have lead to
the establishment of equilibrium behavior.
To test Proposition 2, we analyze whether an increase in the overall number of high
ability contestants leads to a more balanced distribution of talent across contests. More
speciﬁcally, we test the following equation:
S
M
t = α0 + α1HAt + α2B
M
t + t + εt. (5)
The dependent variable, SM
t , measures the level of sorting. It denotes the proportion of
East–African runners who choose to participate in a Major rather than a Minor marathon
in period t. For SM
t = 1 sorting is complete, i.e. East–African runners participate exclu-
sively in Major marathons. The main variable of interest, HAt, is the overall proportion
of East–African runners, in period t. According to Proposition 2, sorting should be de-
creasing in HAt. The variable BM
t denotes the proportion of the total prize money that is
awarded in the Major marathons. According to Proposition 2, sorting should be increas-
22ing in BM
t . We control for time trends as well as whether the year was an Olympic year.
Since marathons can be divided into spring–races and autumn–races and runners typically
choose one from each group, we consider contest choice, for a given gender category, per
season rather than per year to allow for a richer analysis.
Table 6 shows the estimates for equation (5). Since in our theoretical model the
number of strong contests is identical to the number of weak contests, we ﬁrst restrict
our analysis (columns 1 to 4) to the top ten races. These races include the ﬁve Major
marathons, as well as the next ﬁve most important races (Hamburg, Honolulu, Frankfurt,
Paris, and Rome). In columns 5 to 8, we consider the runners’ allocation across all 35
races. The results are similar for both samples.
We ﬁnd that an increase in the fraction of high ability contestants leads to a signiﬁcant
decrease in sorting. More speciﬁcally, as the fraction of East–African runners in the top
10 races increases by 1 percent, the share of East–Africans who choose a Major marathon
decreases by 1.03 percent. The eﬀect is even stronger, 1.23 percent, when all 35 races
are considered. These results constitute evidence for the decrease in sorting depicted in
Figure 1. As expected, we also ﬁnd evidence for a positive relation between sorting and
prize budget diﬀerences. In particular, a 1 percent increase in the proportion of prize
money awarded by the Major races, leads to an increase in the share of East–African
runners entering a Major race by 1.17 percent for the top 10 races and by 0.49 percent
for all 35 races.
It is reassuring that these eﬀects persist when we control for time trends, gender and
diﬀerential trends across gender. We see that in an Olympic year, the proportion of East–
African runners entering a Major marathon increases by 10 percent. This is intuitive
since participation in the Olympics is restricted by country quotas. Due to the large
number of talented Kenyan and Ethiopian runners, many of them are unable to run the
Olympic marathon whereas runners of comparable ability but diﬀerent nationality are
able to participate with a higher probability. As a result, the proportion of East–African
23runners in the Major races, the next best alternative, is higher in Olympic years.
We check the robustness of these results by using an alternative proxy for talent.
Rather than using origin, we identify a group of high ability runners in a given season
using a ranking of performances. Note that, since eﬀort and ability are hard to separate,
ﬁnishing times may be related to prize money. An advantage of using origin is therefore
that this deﬁnition of high ability is independent of prize money considerations. We
identify high ability runners as those runners who have (adjusted) ﬁnishing times within
1 percent of the fastest ﬁnishing time during the season.20 We also look at those ﬁnishing
within 5 percent and 10 percent of the fastest time, respectively. We conjecture that
changes in the overall number of high ability runners over the years are a result of the
increase in African participation. However, this measure of high ability is less restrictive,
especially if the quality and the composition of the group of East–African runners is
changing over time.
Table 7 shows that our main results still hold when we repeat the analysis for the
alternative measure of ability based on rankings. The sorting of high ability runners into
Major races is increasing in the proportion of prize money on oﬀer, but decreasing in the
overall proportion of high ability runners. Interestingly, the decrease is the stronger the
more able the runners under consideration. In particular, a 10 percent increase in the
proportion of high ability runners, reduces sorting by 46, 7, or 3 percent when high ability
refers to runners within 1, 5, or 10 percent of the fastest time, respectively. Finally, note
that in contrast to our estimation based on runners’ origin, the Olympic year dummy is
no longer signiﬁcant which is in line with the reasoning provided above.
6 Conclusion
How do contestants choose in which contest to compete? And how much do they value
potential prize oﬀerings relative to expected opposition? Do contestants prefer contests
20The identiﬁcation of high ability runners is done separately for men and women.
24with high prizes and strong opposition over contests with low prizes and weak opposition?
And how do these preferences depend on their abilities? In this paper we have provided
both theoretical as well as empirical insight into these questions.
We have shown that the allocation of talent across contests depends on its overall
distribution within the population of potential contestants. The standard intuition that
contestants sort according to abilities fails to hold in general. Sorting is decreasing as high
abilities become more frequent and reverse sorting has been shown to be a possibility. Our
analysis has allowed us to determine the “prize” that contestants are willing to pay for
a decrease in opposition and that organizers have to award to guarantee their contest’s
attractiveness.
In future research we plan to further expand our understanding of contest selection.
One issue of interest is the inﬂuence of peer eﬀects on contest choice. These eﬀects are
common in models of school choice where students are assumed to care not only about
their ranking within their class but also about the average quality of their peers (Damiano
et al. (2010)). While competition is not explicitly modeled by the peer eﬀect literature,
in a contest setting, the relative value of rankings would be directly determined by the
contest’s prize structure.
Appendix 1 - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
It is immediate that E
j
H is increasing in wj, bj, and Mj, but decreasing in pj. To prove
the last claim of Proposition 1, increase the steepness of contest j’s prize structure by
25letting ˜ Mj < Mj and ˜ bj > bj and consider
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N−1−m
= bjProb( ˜ Mj ≤ Hj ≤ Mj − 1) − (˜ bj − bj)Prob(Hj ≤ ˜ Mj − 1).
The ﬁrst term represents the advantage of the ﬂatter prize structure. When the number
of opponents Hj turns out to be between ˜ Mj and Mj − 1 then the ﬂatter prize structure
guarantees a positive payoﬀ, bj, whereas payoﬀs are zero for the steeper prize structure.
The second term represents the advantage of the steeper prize structure. When the
number of high ability opponents is smaller or equal to ˜ Mj − 1 then payoﬀs are positive
for both prize structures but the steeper prize structure oﬀers an extra payoﬀ ˜ bj −bj > 0.
Note that the likelihood ratio Prob(Hj ≤ ˜ Mj − 1)/Prob( ˜ Mj ≤ Hj ≤ Mj − 1) is strictly
decreasing in p. It converges to 0 for pj → 1 and to ∞ for pj → 0. Hence there exists
a ¯ pj ∈ (0,1) such that E
j
H − ˜ E
j
H ≥ 0 if and only if pj > ¯ pj. The steeper prize structure
( ˜ Mj, ˜ bj) guarantees a higher payoﬀ if and only if the likelihood pj with which opponents
have high ability is smaller than ¯ pj.
Proof of Proposition 2
In a contest where an opponent has high ability with probability p, let








denote the expected number of high ability opponents conditional on this number being
at most M − 1. Let
Ep[H] = p(N − 1) (8)
denote the (unconditional) expected number of high ability opponents.
26Consider ﬁrst the case where h < 1
2. In this case the number of high ability players falls
short of the number of slots in each type of contest. Hence a strictly positive fraction of
slots in each type of contest are ﬁlled with low ability contestants so that pS = 2hq ∈ (0,1)
and pW = 2h(1 − q) ∈ (0,1). The equilibrium is determined by







































The higher the fraction of high ability players who choose contests of type S, the less
willing are high ability players to enter such contests.
The fact that bS > bW implies that
∆(q = 0) = bS − bWG(MW,2h) > 0. (14)
Hence there cannot exist an equilibrium in which q∗ = 0. Moreover
∆(q = 1) = bSG(MS,2h) − bW. (15)
Note that ∆(q = 1) is strictly decreasing in h with ∆(q = 1) = −bW < 0 for h = 1
2 and
∆(q = 1) = bS − bW > 0 for h → 0. Hence there exists a unique ¯ h ∈ (0, 1
2) such that
∆(q = 1) ≥ 0 if and only if h ≤ ¯ h. An equilibrium where q∗ = 1 therefore exists if and
only if h ≤ ¯ h. Moreover, the equation ∆(q∗) = 0 has a solution q∗ ∈ (0,1) if and only
27if h > ¯ h. This solution and hence the equilibrium is unique. We now determine how q∗






















{EpW[H|H ≤ MW − 1] − EpW[H]}.














{EpW[H|H ≤ MW − 1] − EpW[H]}.
It is one of the properties of the binomial distribution that the diﬀerence between the
unconditional and the tail conditional mean increases more strongly than linearly in the
underlying probability p (Johnson et al. 1992). Thus the ﬁrst term is strictly decreasing
in pS. Since for q∗ ≥ 1
2 it holds that pS ≥ pW we can therefore ﬁnd an upper bound for





≤ EpW[H|H ≤ MS − 1] − EpW[H|H ≤ MW − 1] < 0. (19)
The last inequality followed from MS < MW. Hence we have shown that at any equi-
librium such that q∗ ≥ 1
2 and hence p∗
S ≥ p∗
W it holds that d∆
dh|q=q∗ < 0. Together with
d∆
dq < 0 this implies that q∗ is strictly decreasing in h ∈ (¯ h, 1
2) as long as q∗ ≥ 1
2.
It remains to consider the case where h ≥ 1
2. For q ≤ 1 − 1
2h we have pW = 1 and
pS ∈ (0,1) so that ∆(q) = bSG(MS,pS) > 0. Hence in equilibrium it has to hold that
q∗ > 1 −
1
2h. Similarly for q ≥
1
2h we ﬁnd pS = 1 and pW ∈ (0,1) so that ∆(q) =
−bWG(MW,pW) < 0. Hence in equilibrium it has to hold that q∗ < 1
2h. For 1 − 1
2h <
q < 1
2h, ∆(q) is given by (9), and the equilibrium q∗ is the unique solution to ∆(q∗) = 0
in (1 − 1
2h, 1
2h). Hence all the arguments used in the case where h < 1
2 remain valid. In
particular q∗ is strictly decreasing in h ∈ (1
2,1) as long as q∗ ≥ 1
2.
28Hence we can conclude that there exists a ¯ ¯ h ∈ (¯ h,1] such that q∗(h) is strictly decreas-
ing in (¯ h,¯ ¯ h) and q∗ ≤ 1
2 for all h > ¯ ¯ h.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium. The fraction q∗ of high ability players who choose strong com-
petition in dependence of the overall fraction h of high ability players in the population.
Figure 2: Total Prize Money in Marathons. Prize money is measured in
US$(millions) and is for men’s marathons only. It is aggregated over the 5 Major
marathons and over all 35 marathons in the dataset, respectively.
30Figure 3: Competitiveness of Marathon Running. Competitiveness is deﬁned as the
ratio of the best (male) winning time of a year over the average ﬁnishing times of top 20
(male) ﬁnishers in all races. Finishing times are adjusted for race–course diﬀerences.
Figure 4: Contest Choice. “Proportion of HA (total)” is the proportion of high ability
(East–African) runners in the 10 races under consideration. “Proportion of HA in Major”
is the share of high ability runners who chose a Major race (Berlin, Boston, Chicago,
London, New York) rather than a Minor race (Hamburg, Honolulu, Frankfurt, Paris,
Rome). For men’s marathons only.
31Major Races Minor Races
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Total Prize ($) 238 221,689 126,466 1381 26,371 40,460
Steep Prize 238 0.57 0.5 1381 0.35 0.48
No. of Participants 236 22,332 10,143 859 6,838 6,462
Winning Time (hh:min) 238 02:17 00:09 1381 02:25 00:13
Fraction HA (Origin) 238 0.18 0.18 1381 0.14 0.22
Fraction HA (1%) 238 0.03 0.06 1381 0 0.02
Fraction HA (5%) 238 0.29 0.26 1381 0.08 0.17
Fraction HA (10%) 238 0.66 0.29 1381 0.36 0.36
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Races). Means and standard deviations for Major and
Minor marathons, respectively. The sample period is 1986 to 2009. “Total Prize” is the
sum of prizes awarded in a race. “Steep Prize” takes value 1 if the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman
index, calculated for the top three prizes, is above its mean value. “No. of Participants”
is the total number of participants including amateurs in a race. This data was collected
separately from various sources, including ARRS, Wikipedia, and race websites. “Winning
Time” is adjusted using ARRS conversion factors to ensure that times are comparable
across races. “Fraction HA (Origin)” refers to the fraction of runners from East Africa.
“Fraction HA (1%), (5%), (10%)” refers to the fraction of runners ﬁnishing within 1%,
5% and 10% of the best time of the year, respectively.
32Male Runners
East African Runners All other Runners
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Age 2892 28.78 4.54 7515 30.63 4.84
No. Races 2892 1.42 0.6 7515 1.27 0.53
Prize ($) 2892 8,307 19,698 7515 3,360 10,406
Finishing Time 2892 02:14 00:05 7515 02:17 00:05
Fraction HA (1%) 2892 0.02 0.15 7515 0.01 0.12
Fraction HA (5%) 2892 0.28 0.45 7515 0.21 0.41
Fraction HA (10%) 2892 0.73 0.45 7515 0.67 0.47
Female Runners
East African Runners All other Runners
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Age 646 27.69 4.44 7729 31.76 6.03
No. Races 646 1.45 0.59 7729 1.31 0.59
Prize ($) 646 13,539 27,229 7729 4,031 12’175
Finishing Time 646 02:33 00:08 7729 02:41 00:09
Fraction HA (1%) 646 0.01 0.1 7729 0.01 0.07
Fraction HA (5%) 646 0.17 0.37 7729 0.06 0.25
Fraction HA (10%) 646 0.5 0.5 7729 0.26 0.44
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Runners). Means and standard deviations (by gen-
der category) for East–African and Non–East–African runners, respectively. The sample
period is 1986 to 2009. “No. of Races” is the number of races run in a given year.
“Prize” is the prize money a runner obtains (on average) per race. “Finishing Times”
have been adjusted using ARRS conversion factors to ensure that race courses are compa-
rable. “Fraction HA (1%), (5%), (10%)” refers to the fraction of runners ﬁnishing within
1%, 5% and 10% of the best time of the year, respectively.
33OLS OLS OLS OLS
VARIABLES Enter Major Enter Major Enter Major Enter Major
Oppositiont−1 -0.5957*** -0.5743*** -0.1137*** -0.1172***
[0.030] [0.034] [0.033] [0.040]
Total Prize (’00000$) 0.2432*** 0.2313*** 0.0140** 0.0139**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Steep Prize -0.003 -0.0017 0.0144 0.0132
[0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012]
Oppositiont−1·Steep Prize 0.0067
[0.042]
Female 0.0041 0.0172 0.0172
[0.012] [0.019] [0.019]
Age -0.0003*** -0.0001** -0.0001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Nationality -0.0005* -0.0006*** -0.0006***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
At Home 0.1041 0.0087 0.0088
[0.077] [0.053] [0.053]






Olympic Year 0.0032 0.0032
[0.009] [0.009]
Constant 0.3122*** 0.4497*** 0.1637 0.1633
[0.009] [0.018] [0.135] [0.135]
Race Fixed Eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Observations 5492 5469 5469 5469
R-Squared 0.349 0.363 0.717 0.717
Table 3: Probability to Enter Major Race (OLS). *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Estimations use linear probability model. The sample
is restricted to the runners who were amongst the top 100 Non–East–African runners in
the previous year. “Oppositiont−1”, is the fraction of East-African runners amongst the
top20 ﬁnishers of the race in the previous year. “Rankt−1” is the ranking of the runner
in the previous year (between 1 and 100). “Olympic Year” takes value 1 in years 1988,
1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 and 0 in all other years.
34VARIABLES Oppositiont−1 Total Prize (’00000$)
Commodity Price Index Kenyat−1 0.0018***
[0.000]
Log Rainfall Kenyat−1 0.0917*
[0.048]
Commodity Price Index Ethiopiat−1 -0.0005***
[0.000]









Race Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5369
R-Squared 0.649 0.743
F-Test of Excl. Instr. 26.25 88.14
Table 4: First Stage IV. *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respec-
tively. “Commodity Price Index Kenya (Ethiopia)” uses international commodity price
data from IMF. All variables indexed by t − 1 relate to the previous year. “Exchange
Rate” is the exchange rate of the country of the race relative to the Special Drawing
Rights currency basket provided by the IMF.
35IV IV IV IV
(Oppositiont−1) (Total Prize) (Both) (Both)
VARIABLES Enter Top 5 Enter Major Enter Major Enter Major
Oppositiont−1 -0.5894** -0.1200*** -0.5145** -0.4922**
[0.244] [0.035] [0.240] [0.249]
Total Prize (’00000$) 0.0157*** 0.1309*** 0.1042** 0.1049**
[0.006] [0.047] [0.045] [0.045]
Steep Prize 0.0149 -0.0207 -0.0119 -0.0089
[0.010] [0.017] [0.016] [0.019]
Oppositiont−1·Steep Prize -0.019
[0.056]
Female 0.0343 0.0292 0.0416** 0.0412*
[0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021]
Age -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Nationality -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
At Home 0.0141 0.0067 0.0116 0.0113
[0.054] [0.055] [0.053] [0.053]
Rankt−1 -0.0011*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0009***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Trend 0.007 -0.0096*** 0.0003 -0.0001
[0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006]
Trend·Female -0.0064** 0.0002 -0.0047 -0.0045
[0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003]
Olympic Year 0.0033 0.015 0.0121 0.0121
[0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Constant 0.1071 0.9027*** 0.8978*** 0.8975***
[0.141] [0.079] [0.080] [0.080]
Race Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5469 5368 5368 5368
R-Squared 0.706 0.695 0.717 0.717
Table 5: Probability to Enter Major Race (IV). *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. For deﬁnition of variables see Table 3.
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VARIABLES Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting
Fraction HA (Origin) -0.7742*** -0.3551** -1.0272** -1.2758** -0.6214*** -0.5321*** -1.2260** -1.3164***
[0.187] [0.171] [0.501] [0.494] [0.131] [0.125] [0.471] [0.465]
Prize Major 1.1128*** 1.1749*** 1.2193*** 0.4822*** 0.4887*** 0.5204***
[0.190] [0.195] [0.189] [0.139] [0.138] [0.137]
Female -0.0894* -0.0734* -0.2516 -0.2575* -0.009 -0.0297 0.0303 0.0139
[0.050] [0.042] [0.153] [0.148] [0.035] [0.033] [0.113] [0.111]
Trend 0.0125 0.02 0.0250* 0.0271*
[0.017] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
Trend·Female 0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0099 -0.0102
[0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006]
Olympic Year 0.0967** 0.0598*
[0.039] [0.031]
Constant 0.8727*** -0.2134 -0.1688 -0.2579 0.4619*** 0.1331 -0.0424 -0.0743
[0.097] [0.202] [0.280] [0.273] [0.065] [0.113] [0.175] [0.173]
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
R-Squared 0.19 0.448 0.471 0.513 0.275 0.375 0.399 0.429
Table 6: Sorting of High Ability Runners (Origin). *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respec-
tively. Years from 1986 until 2009. The dependent variable, “Sorting”, is the proportion of East African runners who
entered a Major rather than a Minor race. “Fraction HA (Origin)”, is the overall fraction of East African runners in
the races under consideration. Both variables are calculated separately for each race season (spring, autumn) and gender
category. “Prize Major” is the proportion of the overall prize money awarded in the Major races. For deﬁnition of variables
see Table 3.
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VARIABLES Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting
Fraction HA (1%) -1.9589*** -4.6357**
[0.707] [2.148]
Fraction HA (5%) -0.2751* -0.7163***
[0.159] [0.214]
Fraction HA (10%) -0.1194 -0.3075***
[0.146] [0.110]
Prize Major 0.3263* 1.0318*** 1.1413*** 1.2664*** 0.7091*** 0.4475***
[0.176] [0.126] [0.119] [0.286] [0.140] [0.082]
Female -0.1602 -0.0097 -0.0432 0.1364 -0.0995 -0.1608*
[0.128] [0.105] [0.122] [0.221] [0.112] [0.083]
Trend -0.0193** -0.0139** -0.0036 0.0171 -0.0170** -0.0166***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.014] [0.007] [0.005]
Trend·Female 0.0102* 0.0027 -0.0007 -0.0086 0.006 0.0063**
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.010] [0.005] [0.003]
Olympic Year 0.0233 -0.0231 0.0071 -0.0634 -0.0008 0.0137
[0.035] [0.025] [0.023] [0.061] [0.028] [0.016]
Constant 1.0270*** 0.1 -0.1355 -0.3148 0.4351* 0.5788**
[0.259] [0.242] [0.336] [0.380] [0.240] [0.220]
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79
R-Squared 0.314 0.719 0.692 0.364 0.603 0.622
Table 7: Sorting of High Ability Runners (Finishing Times). *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
level, respectively. Years from 1986 until 2009. The dependent variable, “Sorting”, is the proportion of high ability runners
who entered a Major rather than a Minor race. High ability runners have (adjusted) ﬁnishing times within 1%, 5%, or
10% of the year’s fastest time in their gender category. “Fraction HA (1%, 5%, 10%)”, is the overall fraction of high ability
runners in the races under consideration. Both variables are calculated separately for each race season (spring, autumn)
and gender category. “Prize Major” is the proportion of the overall prize money awarded in the Major races. For deﬁnition
of variables see Table 3.
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